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O’Brien and Detter: The Law of War

They point out that comparisons of
present policies to those of the British at
Munich are premature and that it is not
their intention to draw precise parallels
between the British and U.S. experiences. However, these admissions come
only in the very last chapter, after the
reader has had every opportunity to
make just such comparisons.
Despite these critical comments, While
America Sleeps is very much worth reading. The Kagans are asking the right
questions. Their warnings about the fate
of states that reduce military capabilities
to dangerously low levels, lack consistent
strategic visions, and replace sound
strategy with wishful thinking are more
germane than ever.
So too are the questions their work
points to but does not ask. Can democracies avoid reducing military capabilities without the impetus of a visible
external threat? Does state behavior
motivated by self-interest weaken all alliances over time? Can a democracy
survive taking on the mantle of world
policeman? Can wars be prevented
through consistent displays of strength
and purpose? These are questions that
reading this book evokes, questions that
should be considered and discussed far
more than they are.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

Detter, Ingrid. The Law of War. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000. (2d ed.) 516pp.
$39.95

This is the second edition of Ingrid
Detter’s sweeping survey of the law relating to the “modern state of war.” The
first edition, published in 1987, was then
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reviewed by, among others, Professors
Howard Levie (American Journal of International Law, vol. 83 [1989], p. 194)
and Leslie Green (Canadian Yearbook of
International Law [1988], p. 473), two
distinguished former holders of the
Stockton Chair of International Law at
the Naval War College. Both reviewers
identified numerous inaccuracies and
misreadings of source documents. The
second edition is intended to explore the
changing legal context of modern warfare since 1987. A reader interested in
this edition should first read the earlier
reviews. Regrettably, the representative
deficiencies pointed out by Levie and
Green still persist, and a fully balanced
discussion of particularly important legal
issues is lacking.
Typical errors left unchanged include
Detter’s erroneous position regarding
the treatment of prisoners of war. She
states that the 1949 “Geneva Convention
III on Prisoners of War specifies [in Article 4] that there need be no fighting for
the Convention to apply; it is sufficient
for persons to be captured.” There is no
such provision in the convention. Detter
also continues to assert that the convention provides that prisoners of war must
not be subjected to interrogation, because Article 17 obliges prisoners to provide only their name, rank, date of birth,
and serial number. Article 17, however,
then continues, proscribing physical or
mental torture, or any other form of coercion, to secure information from prisoners of war. Interrogation short of such
prohibited actions is not prohibited by
the convention. While a prisoner of war
is required to give the identifying information, international law does not prohibit a prisoner from giving more than
this, nor a captor from seeking more
—so long as torture is not used.
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Astonishingly, Detter continues to insist
that the actions taken during the Korean
War never had authorization from the
United Nations. She states that the military operations were only “a collective
security action of certain States, as there
was no actual UN authorization for the
action.” She asserts further that “the
troops operating under the aegis of the
United Nations in Korea may not have
been forces of the United Nations as the
decision to take action had been taken
without the vote of the former Soviet
Union, a permanent member of the UN
Security Council.” Detter continues,
“The units were probably troops of the
collective operation of the Western powers, but as such, detached from their respective home States and placed under a
collective command which, at least on
an ad hoc basis, functioned as an international organization.”
As noted by Levie in his review, the legally significant actions taken by the Security Council were in Resolution 1511
of 27 June 1950, calling on all members
to offer assistance to the Republic of
Korea, and Resolution 1588 of 7 July
1950, requesting that members offering
assistance do so through a unified command under the United States and authorizing it to use the United Nations
flag. That the Soviet Union chose to boycott Security Council meetings was significant politically but not legally with
respect to the actions taken by the Security Council in authorizing action under
Article 42 in Korea.
It is bewildering that Detter in the second edition did not make the proper
corrections about both the Prisoner of
War Convention and the legal basis of
the Korean conflict, given the prominence and qualifications of the earlier
critical reviewers.
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The last passage above also illustrates
Detter’s distracting tendency to mix personal opinions with legal analysis, which
does little to present a balanced view of
the state of the law. In discussing the basis for intervention by Nato in Kosovo,
Detter describes Kosovo as “a province
of Yugoslavia which . . . sought, and deserved” autonomy from Serbia. She argues that nonstate “groups” should be
allowed to adhere to treaties on the law
of war, reasoning that “it is important to
abolish the unequal idiosyncrasy that
States are bound by obligations under
the Law of War by treaties but groups,
because of their inequality, are not.”
Moreover, she states that “much has
been written about the ambit of article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter
[which prohibits the threat or use of
force by members in their relations with
each other]; there is above all an area of
doubt as to whether the article covers
economic force.” The issue whether economic force is included in the Article
2(4) prohibition (it is not) was settled
long ago—it is not at all an area of
doubt.
Claiming that the second edition is intended to incorporate changes since
1987, Detter provides disappointingly
little discussion on information operations. In less than two pages, she notes
that information technology has introduced a new form of warfare and that
collateral damage to nonmilitary targets
is a risk of information operations.
Much more could have been presented
about when information operations constitute a use of force under Article 2(4),
when a state may consider an information attack an armed attack and respond
in self-defense under Article 51 of the
charter, or how the law regulating the
use of force applies to information
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operations. While little was written in
the late 1980s and early 1990s about the
international legal issues associated with
information operations, a cottage industry on the topic has grown over the latter
part of the decade, and Detter’s book
suffers without a fuller discussion of this
topic.
Detter’s treatment of the law of naval
warfare is similarly incomplete. She fails
to include discussion of modern maritime interception operations beyond a
cursory mention of the coalition operations conducted in the Arabian Gulf
since 1991, and she only briefly covers
the UN-authorized operations in Haiti
and the Balkans. Although Nato’s operations in Kosovo are discussed at great
length in other parts of the book, Detter
does not address the vigorous debate
that ensued among Nato members about
the propriety of interdicting delivery of
refined oil intended for Yugoslavia.
Some Nato members believed that the
authority to do so was based on the belligerent right of visit and search, while
others claimed that Nato was not involved in an international armed conflict, a predicate for the belligerent right.
With respect to maritime war zones,
Detter states that “defensive” war zones
are allowed if they do not extend for
more than twelve miles offshore and are
effectively supervised, while “offensive”
zones, in which merchant ships are sunk,
are illegal even if warnings are provided.
Both these statements are patently
wrong. Customary international law
provides that within the immediate area
of naval operations, a belligerent may establish special restrictions on the activities of neutral vessels and aircraft and may
prohibit altogether such vessels and aircraft from entering the area. The “immediate area” or vicinity of naval operations is
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that area within which hostilities are
taking place or belligerent forces are actually operating. Such an area could exceed twelve miles and could also be in
some location other than near the shore
of one belligerent. Additionally, while
merchant shipping generally enjoys
greater protection from targeting than
enemy warships, it is not an absolute
protection. Under particularly defined
exceptions, merchant shipping is liable
to being targeted by a belligerent.
Detter also concludes, concerning the
torpedoing of the Argentine cruiser
General Belgrano by the submarine HMS
Conqueror when both were outside the
British total-exclusion zone during the
Falklands War, that it was “highly questionable whether the sinking was compatible with international law, especially
as the [warship] was heading for its
home base and posed no threat to the
British armed forces.” This too is a misstatement of the law. Generally, enemy
warships are subject to attack, destruction, or capture anywhere beyond neutral territory. Thus the sinking of
Belgrano, even beyond the declared British total exclusion zone, was a legitimate
act of war.
Conspicuously absent from Detter’s assessment of the law of naval warfare is
any citation or reference to the International Institute on Humanitarian Law’s
Manual on International Law Applicable
to Armed Conflict at Sea (the San Remo
Manual). The San Remo Manual, issued
in 1994 and published in 1995, is a contemporary restatement of the law applicable to armed conflicts at sea. It was
compiled by a panel of international law
experts from various countries as an attempt to restate the customary and treaty
law of naval warfare. It is not binding authority on states, but it is nonetheless
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persuasive evidence of the current law.
The United States does not agree with
every provision in the manual, nor does
any other state. Still, it is a fundamental
source document that must be considered in any discussion of the law of naval
warfare. As such, it is inexcusable of
Detter not to cite it. Failing to do so detracts greatly from the text. Using the
manual would have provided balance,
and familiarity with it should have
helped to avoid the errors described.
In Leslie Green’s review of Detter’s first
edition, he concluded that “regrettably,
it can hardly be said that Dr. Detter De
Lupis’ Law of War provides the reader
with any real practical account of ‘the
body of rules which regulates relationships in war.’ ” Levie, after devastatingly
recounting the representative errors and
inaccuracies in the first edition, left to
the reader to judge “whether [these errors] are important or unimportant,
could a political leader or a military
commander accept and rely on advice
based upon this volume as authority?”
Unfortunately, the passage of more than
ten years and the addition of new information do not warrant improving these
two assessments of Detter’s The Law of
War. Like the first edition, the second is
not a very useful book if one is looking
for a basic understanding of the law of
war, nor is it helpful in advancing the
development of that law.
GREG O’BRIEN

Commander, JAGC, USN
Naval War College

Podvig, Pavel, ed. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001. 692pp. $45

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/16

This comprehensive encyclopedia of all
Russian (and Soviet) nuclear weapons
systems deserves attention not only because all earlier versions were confiscated by the Russian Security Service
(FSB) but because it is a complete and
authoritative chronology of the weapons, warheads, and delivery systems that
enabled the Soviet Union to achieve “superpower” status. Authored by Russian
physicists and mathematicians using
only unclassified data bases, the book
tells the “official” story of how Soviet
and Russian bureaucracies built the
world’s most fearsome nuclear arsenal
from World War II until the mid-1990s.
Organized by function and military services, the story is easy to follow for a
reader reasonably conversant with the
systems and willing to plow through
tables and specifications. The book’s objective, clinical, and dispassionate treatment is both its strongest and weakest
point. It presents all the facts. The data
presented in the tables and notes probably could not have been fabricated at this
level of detail. However, the book makes
no judgments or any effort to place its
contents in political context.
The chapter on the Soviet navy details
how technology shaped strategy. The development of the R-29 sea-launched ballistic missile (Nato’s SS-N-8) and the
Project 667B (Nato’s Delta I) submarine
put the Soviet ballistic submarine force
within range of its American targets
while remaining in the “bastions” of
the ice-covered regions of the Arctic,
thus obviating the need for the “Yankee
patrols” (by Yankee-type submarines
carrying SS-N-6 missiles). With only
one-third of the range of the SS-N-8,
the SS-N-6 missile was a threat only
when it was brought near the U.S. coast,
where the submarine could be constantly
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